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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE
NOT A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS
California police strongly suspected the petitioner of bookmaking, but
had no evidence with which to convict him. In his absence they arranged to
have a key to his door made and subsequently entered his home in order to
install a microphone. The police bored a hole in petitioner's roof, through
which they extended the wires to a neighboring garage. On two later oc-
casions the officers reentered to adjust the microphone, moving it first from
the hall to the bedroom and then from the bedroom to the closer. The
petitioner was convicted in a California state court on information ob-
tained by use of the microphone. On certiorari, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction.'
The petitioner's contention that the use of this evidence was a violation
of the Federal Communications Act was summarily rejected, since it was
eavesdropping at most, and the apparatus was not connected in any way to
the telephone facilities.' The court held also that it is well settled that the
Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution does not apply to state
prosecutions.4 The petitioner's strongest contention was that the case of
Rochin v. People of California5 was applicable. In the Rochin case the
police, having information that the petitioner was peddling cocaine, forced
their way into his room. When they entered, the petitioner put a capsule
in his mouth and swallowed it. The police took him to the hospital, where
the capsule was extracted by use of a stomach pump. The United States
Supreme Court held that such evidence was inadmissible as a violation of
due process of law, basing their decision on the broad doctrine that, "Regard
for the requirements of the Due Process Clause inescapably imposes upon
this Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole course of proceedings
(resulting in conviction) in order to ascertain whether they offend those
canons of decency and fairness which express the notion of justice of Eng-
lish-speaking peoples even toward those charged with heinous offenses."
The court in the principal case held that the Rochin case was inapplicable
'Irvine v. People, 347 U.S. 128, 74 Sup. Ct. 381 (1954).
2 Id. at 131, 74 Sup. Ct. at 382.
' "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable search and seizure, shall not be violated, and, no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath and affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized."
'See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 Sup. Ct. 1359 (1949).
'342 U.S. 165, 72 Sup. Ct. 205 (1951).
'Id. at 169, 72 Sup. Ct. at 208.
'347 U.S. 128, 142, 74 Sup. Ct. 381, 389.
(Slimmer
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since the element of coercios and physical assault was lacking, although, as
pointed out by the dissent of Justice Frankfurter, the case presents a fact
situation which goes far beyond normal search and seizure and is flagrantly
repugnant to our concepts of justice and fairness.
The Rochin case was the first decision holding that illegally obtained
evidence could be inadmissible under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, although there was a strong dictum to this effect in an
earlier case." There was concern among many writers as to how widely the
"vague contours" of Due Process were going to be applied to prevent the
admission of such evidence.9 The writers point out, by way of analogy,
that the rule against permitting coerced confessions in state prosecutions
-under the Due Process Clause also originated in a case'0 where physical
coercion was used. This early case was decided on the basis that brutal
coercion resulted in unreliable confessions. However, less "force" is now
required to reject a confession as "coerced,"" and unreliability is no longer
the rationale for rejection of such confessions; rather, it is held that confes-
sions so obtained corrupt the trial and are therefore inadmissible. 2 This
present rule regarding confessions is very liberal compared to the rule as it
was first formulated, and the writers speculated as to whether the Rochin
doctrine would also be rapidly liberalized.
The principal case is the first case in which the Rochin doctrine has been
seriously argued and its broadness construed.' 3 When the Rochin case was
decided, the court stated with accurate foresight that, "We are not un-
mindful that hypothetical situations can be conjured up, shading imper-
ceptibly from the circumstances of this case and by gradations producing
practical differences despite seemingly logical extensions."' 4 In the prin-
cipal case the court wisely limited the application of the Rochin case to
situations involving physical coercion and assaults upon the person, thus
8Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 Sup. Ct. 1359 (1949).
9 See 37 CoNN. L. Rnv. 483 (1952); 36 MrNN. L. REV. (1952); 24 RocKY
MOUNT. L. REv. 386 (1952); 25 So. CALiF. L. REv. 357 (1952); 5 VAND. L
REv. 648 (1952).
"Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 Sup. Ct. 461 (1936).
'See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 Sup. Ct. 1347 (1949) (persistent question-
ing several hours per day for five days); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 Sup. Ct.
302 (1948) (15-year-old not told of his rights, kept incommunicado, five hours of
questioning); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 65 Sup. Ct. 781 (1945) (kept
undressed for several hours, incommunicado).
' Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 65 Sup. Ct. 781 (1945).
"In People v. Haeussler, 260 P.2d 8 (Cal. 1953), the court held that the Rochin
case did not apply where blood was taken from the defendant by force when he was
unconscious. This decision was a rehearing of People v. Haeussler, 248 P.2d 434
(Cal. 1952), wherein it was held that the Rochh case did apply.
" Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174, 72 Sup. Ct. 205, 210 (1951).
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